Recent Extensions of the Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine by Parker, Norman
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 18 Issue 1 
1932 
Recent Extensions of the Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine 
Norman Parker 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Norman Parker, Recent Extensions of the Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine, 18 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 054 (1932). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol18/iss1/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Other judges have preferred to rely solely on legal processes to
establish a contractual liability. In Ward Baking Co. v. Triz-
zino47 the court said in effect that the contract of warranty be-
tween the original vendor and his immediate vendee is really one
made for the benefit of the ultimate consumer, who may then sue
the original vendor under the American rule of contract law per-
mitting the third-party beneficiary to sue the original obligor.
The courts in Pennsylvania limit the application of the breach
of warranty theory to those instances where the article sold and
prepared by the original vendor is placed in a package which is
not to be opened by the intermediate vendor.48 This apparently
takes cognizance of a physical fact to sustain a privity of con-
tract which is essentially a legal relationship. However, it has
the merit of giving some remedy in warranty to the consumer in
those states which follow the doctrine of Aronowitz v. F. W.
Woolworth C0.49 and hold that there is no implied warranty of
fitness made by the intermediate vendor in such a situation.
The better rule would seem to be in favor of an absolute lia-
bility on the original vendor in view of: (1) the practical diffi-
culty in proving that a certain process in the manufacture of a
foodstuff has been conducted negligently, when the processes of
manufacture are so complicated that an individual not in the em-
ploy of the defendant could have very little knowledge concern-
ing their details; (2) the nature of the use to which food is to be
put, demanding the greatest protection available, which can be
gained most certainly by the imposition of an absolute liability;
(3) the fact that the universal adoption of the "pure food" stat-
utes shows a legislative recognition of a public policy to secure to
the people the utmost protection of the public health; and (4)
the fact that the jury would still exist as a safeguard to prevent
the success of fraudulent suits against a manufacturer by persons
not actually injured by his products.
HERBERT K. Moss, '33.
RECENT EXTENSIONS OF THE RES IPSA LOQUITUR
DOCTRINE
It is a well established principle in the Anglo-American legal
system that specific negligence must be proved in cases of unin-
tended personal injury in order to attach tort liability to the de-
fendant. It is equally well recognized that the doctrine of res
47 (1923) 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N. E. 557.
48 Nock v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works of Pittsburg (1931) 102 Pa. Super.
Ct. Rep. 515, 156 Atl. 537.
49 (1929) 134 Misc. Rep. 272, 236 N. Y. S. 133.
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ipsa loquitur-'"the thing speaks for itself"-exists to modify
the application of this general rule. This latter doctrine, by
means of an inference of negligence founded upon general facts,
permits the plaintiff to recover under certain circumstances with-
out showing any specific negligent act or omission of the de-
fendant.
Like most principles of the common law the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur was applied in actual cases before it was formulated
into precise legal terminology. Probably the earliest instance
of a ruling which was later explained on the basis of this doctrine
was in Christie v. Griggs I in 1809. In that case the plaintiff, a
sailor, had been thrown to the ground and injured when the axle
of a coach, on which he had been riding, suddenly broke. He
sued the owner of the coach. Only the breaking down of the
coach and the injury to the plaintiff were shown. Sir James
Mansfield allowed this general proof of negligence, saying:
I think the plaintiff has made a prima facie case by prov-
ing his going on the coach, the accident, and the damage he
has suffered. It now lies on the other side to show that the
coach was as good a coach as could be made, and the driver
was as skillful a driver as could anywhere be found. What
other evidence could the plaintiff give? The passengers were
probably all sailors like himself ;--and how do they know if
the coach was well built, or whether the coachman drove
skillfully? . . . when the breaking down or overturning of
a coach is proved, negligence on the part of the owner is im-
plied. He has always the means to rebut this presumption,
if it be unfounded; and it is now incumbent on the defelidant
to make out,2 that the damage in this case arose from what
the law considers a mere accident.
Here the fact of the plaintiff's ignorance in regard to the coach
and the consequent impossibility of his protecting himself by
vigilance largely controlled the court's decision. It is extremely
doubtful whether this case would meet the tests imposed by later
decisions for the application of the res ipsa doctrine, since coach
axles probably broke frequently on account of flaws in the ma-
terial even when no one was negligent.
In Byrne v. Boadle,3 decided in 1863, the plaintiff, while pass-
ing the warehouse of the defendant was hit and injured by a bar-
rel of flour which fell from a window of the warehouse. Pollock,
C. B., said that it was the duty of the defendant to see that barrels
1 (1809) 2 Camp. 79, 170 Eng. Repr. 1088.
2 Cf. comment on the effect of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine on the burden
of proof p. 82.
a (1863) 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Repr. 299.
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of flour did not roll out of the windows of his warehouse; such an
occurrence could not happen without some negligence; and since
the plaintiff could not ascertain whether the defendant was
negligent or not, the case "beyond all doubt affords prima facie
evidence of negligence."
The case most frequently cited as formulating the res ipsa
loquitur rule is Scott v. The London & St. Katherine Docks Co.,4
which was decided in 1865. Here the plaintiff was injured by
being struck by six bags of sugar which fell out of a window of
the defendant's warehouse. Erle, C. J., said:
There must be reasonable evidence of negligence.
But where the thing is shown to be under the management
of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as
in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who
have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant,
that the accident arose from want of care.
The first clear statement of the principle in the United States
was by the New York Court of Appeals in Mullen v. St. John,'
where the injury was caused by the falling of a wall of the de-
fendant's building. The Court sustained an instruction to the
jury wherein it was stated that it is reasonable to presume negli-
gence in the absence of explanation when the cause of the accident
is under the control of the defendant and the accident is one which
does not ordinarily happen in the case of non-negligent conduct:
When the plaintiff proved the building fell into the street
and injured her, she had made out a case, in the absence of
any explanation on the part of the defendant, as buildings
do not normally or necessarily fall, and then it is for the jury
to say, under all the evidence, whether that explanation, on
the part of the defendant, is reasonably made.
As has been well pointed out by Cullen, J., in Griffen v. Manice0
it is not enough to prove the mere occurrence of the accident.
it is not the injury, but the manner and circumstances
of the injury that justify the application of the maxim and
the inference of negligence.
From these cases there may be deduced two elements which
traditionally must be present to make possible the application
4 (1865) 3 H. & C. 596, 159 Eng. Repr. 665.
5 (1874) 57 N. Y. 567.
6 (1901) 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925.
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of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.7 The accident must be such as
does not ordinarily happen if there has been no negligence. The
thing which caused the injury must have been under the exclusive
control of the defendant or his agents and servants. The first of
these is decided by observed human experience, but the question
as to the type of control required has been a matter for sharp
legal debate. It would seem to be necessary that the defendant
or his agents and servants have had exclusive right to the physi-
cal control of the instrument involved both at the time of the
alleged negligence and of the injury. From the exclusiveness of
such control and the language used in such early cases as Christie
v. Griggs some courts have derived the further requirement that
the defendant must have had exclusive knowledge of the cause of
the injury and hence that if the plaintiff happens to know some-
thing about the instrumentality involved, he cannot invoke the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, for then he would have the ability
to point out the specific negligence of the plaintiff.8
The application of these general principles to particular fact
situations causes most of the conflicts among the modern cases.
It is true that there are many instances in which the courts do not
differ. Typical of the cases to which the doctrine is universally
applied are those of injury to passengers arising out of the
wrecking or derailment of railroad trains, the courts feeling that
thanks to modern safety devices such accidents do not ordinarily
happen unless there has been negligence in the maintenance of
the track,9 the upkeep and repair of the train, 10 or the actual
operation of the train." The courts are equally unanimous in
regard to injuries from falling objects, on the theory that in-
animate objects do not usually fall from high places unless they
have been put in motion negligently by some human agency or
have been carelessly placed in a precarious position. 12 There is
similar agreement where the plaintiff has been injured by con-
7 Pollock on Torts (13th ed. 1929) 463; Salmond on the Law of Torts
(7th ed. 1928) 34.
8 Patton v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. (1901) 179 U. S. 658; St. Louis,
L M. & S. Ry. Co. v. De Lambert (1914) 112 Ark. 446, 166 S. W. 544; Mensch
v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. (1892) 150 Pa. St. 598, 25 Atl. 31; note (1917)
L. R. A. 1917 E 1; cf. McCloskey v. Koplar (Mo. 1932) 46 S. W. (2d) 557.
Lowery v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1932) 60 F. (2d) 78.
10 Rose v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co. (1913) 121 Minn. 363,
141 N. W. 487.
11 Sullivan v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co. (1916) 224 Mass. 405, 112 N. E.
1025.
12 McCloskey v. Koplar (Mo. 1932) 46 S. W. (2d) 557 (falling radiator in
theater); St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Armbrust (1915) 121 Ark. 351,
181 S. W. 131 (piece of coal from tender of express train); Khron v. Brock
(1887) 144 Mass. 516, 11 N. E. 748 (piece of zinc from roof of building).
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tact with an electrically charged wire1 3 or by the explosion of
chemicals. 14
However, there are many types of accidents in which the courts
have not reached such an accord. In some of these the judges are
divided as to what is shown by human experience, in others as to
whether the necessary element of control is present.
Explosions of boilers not infrequently destroy the boiler so
thoroughly that little information as to the cause of the explosion
can be acquired by an examination of the wreckage. Under these
circumstances the question whether the plaintiff shall have any
real possibility of recovering damages depends upon whether or
not the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is applicable. It is clear that
the control test is satisfied. Those courts which follow the weight
of authority take the view that ordinarily boilers do not explode
unless the person in charge is negligent in allowing the boiler to
operate under too great a head of steam or unless the boiler itself
is inherently defective.' 5 Other judges think that the doctrine
should not be applied because they consider that boilers explode
for no apparent reason and that the application of the doctrine
would make the owner of the boiler virtually an insurer, since it
would be practically impossible to show the real cause of the ex-
plosion.' 6 Under normal circumstances the defendant has not
himself built the boiler and there may well have been hidden de-
fects in its construction which he could not have discovered by
any ordinary inspection. However, if the boiler has been in serv-
ice for some time without trouble and it suddenly explodes, it
does seem reasonable to presume that the defendant or his serv-
ants have been negligent, since then the most probable cause of
I' San Juan Light Co. v. Requena (1912) 224 U. S. 89 (excessive current
in light socket); Denver Consolidated Electric Co. v. Lawrence (1903) 31
Col. 301, 73 Pac. 39 (excessive current in the wires in plaintiff's house) ;
Hoffmann v. Leavenworth Power Co. (1914) 91 Kan. 450, 138 Pac. 632 (de-
fective street light) ; Lynch v. Meyersdale Electric Co. (1920) 268 Pa. St.
337, 112 Atl. 58 (defective light socket).
14 Childs v. Ft. Smith Commission Co. (1919) 139 Ark. 489, 216 S. W. 11(explosion of an ammonia pipe); Motor Sales and Service Inc. v. Grasselli
Chemical Co. (La. App. 1930) 131 So. 623 (drum of sulfuric acid); Krenick
v. Thorndike & Hix, Inc. (1916) 224 Mass. 413, 112 N. E. 1025 (bucket of
lime).
16 Kleinman v. Banner Laundry Co. (1921) 150 Minn. 515, 186 N. W. 123;
Harriss v. Mangum (1922) 183 N. C. 235, 111 S. E. 177; Galveston, H. &
S. A. By. Co. v. Perez (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) 182 S. W. 419; note (1923) 23
A. L. R. 484.
16 Texas & Pacific By. Co. v. Barrett (1897) 166 U. S. 617; Bishop v. Brown
(1900) 14 Col. App. 535, 61 Pac. 50; Reiss v. New York Steam Co. (1891)
128 N. Y. 103, 28 N. E. 24; Vieth v. Hope Salt & Coal Co. (1902) 51 W. Va.
96,41 S. E. 187.
Washington University Open Scholarship
NOTES
the explosion is that the person in charge allowed an excessive
steam pressure to be developed.
The conclusions of the courts with reference to the explosions
of bottles of soda-water are equally divergent. In Wheeler v.
Laurel Bottling Works17 the plaintiff, a restaurant owner, suing
the bottler, had his eye put out by the explosion of a bottle of
Coca-Cola when he raised the lid of the ice box to secure a bottle
for a customer. The Mississippi Supreme Court said:
Just what caused the explosion . . . is a matter largely
of speculation . . . it is possible that when the plaintiff
raised the lid of the ice box, the slight jar may have caused
the bottles in the melting ice to slip or readjust themselves.
It may be that the inrush of the warm air of a June night
might have caused a rapid expansion of the glass.
In short the Court thinks there is too much conjecture about the
cause of the accident. The Mississippi Court would probably
agree with the California Supreme Court, which said:18
Presumptions arise from the doctrine of probabilities.
The future is measured and weighed by the past, and pre-
sumptions are created by the experience of the past. What
has happened in the past under the same conditions will
probably happen in the future, and ordinary and probable
results will be presumed to take place until the contrary is
shown.
However, in this instance the courts disagree as to what "pre-
sumptions are created from the experience of the past." In a
case involving the explosion of a bottle of ginger ale, the Supreme
Court of Missouri has ruled that the bottler was presumably
negligent, provided it was shown that all intermediate handlers
of the article exercised due care.19 The mere fact that there is a
difference of opinion as to what past experience has shown to be
reasonably probable is enough to render uncertain the determina-
tion of the cause of the explosion of the bottle and hence to bar
the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Inferences of
negligence should only be allowed when past experience is inter-
preted in essentially the same way by most courts.
In the case of explosions of bottles of soda water there is a fur-
ther opportunity for diversity of opinion in determining whether
the necessary element of control is present. If the bottler is made
the defendant, he certainly had control of the bottle at one time,
but equally clearly the bottle was in the hands of a third person at
17 (1916) 111 Miss. 442, 71 So. 743.
18 Judson v. Giant Powder Co. (1895) 107 Cal. 549, 40 Pac. 1020.
19 Strolle v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1925) 307 Mo. 520, 271 S. W. 497.
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the time it exploded.* The courts which are desirous of applying
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine are inclined to gloss over this
obstacle. They either challenge the fundamental proposition
that the defendant must have had complete control of the thing
both at the time of the negligence and at the time of the injury 20
or they conclude that the product is such that the control of the
bottler is constructively continued until the bottle is uncapped. 21
Courts which do not apply the doctrine maintain that actual con-
trol must be present both at the time of negligence and of the in-
jury.2 2 Because the contents of the bottle cannot be tampered
with by anyone before the bottle is opened, the doctrine of con-
structive control has considerable plausibility.
Somewhat the same considerations apply when the injury has
occurred in the course of an X-ray treatment. Some courts ap-
ply the res ipsa loquitur theory against the operator on the
ground that the use of the X-ray is so well systematized that he
should know the proper intensity to use and that if a burn results
it shows either that the instrument was defective or that an im-
proper formula was used to determine the correct intensity.2 In
either case the operator would be presumably negligent. Other
courts deny the plaintiff the benefit of the doctrine because they
are influenced by considerations of broad social policy as to who
should bear the risks of such injury.24 They point out that physi-
cians use many dangerous instruments and that if the doctrine
applied to X-rays it would just as logically apply to all, the result
being that the practitioner might be made into a virtual insurer
by unsympathetic jurors. It may also be doubted whether scien-
tific knowledge has yet progressed sufficiently far to say that the
doctor has physical control over the rays themselves, once they
have been projected from his machine.
There are other circumstances in which it seems probable that
some one has been negligent, but there is doubt whether or not
the defendant had sufficient control of the thing involved for the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine to be applied. This aspect of the sub-
ject is chiefly important in connection with injuries arising from
the presence of foreign matter in food or accidents caused by
automobiles or airplanes.
2
o Payne v. Rome Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (1912) 10 Ga. App. 762, 73 S. E.
1087.
21 Grant v. Graham Chero-Cola Bottling Co. (1918) 176 N. C. 256, 97 S. E.
27.
22 Stone v. Van Noy Railway News Co. (1913) 153 Ky. 240, 154 S. W.
1092; Noonan v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. (1927) 104 N. J. L. 136,
139 Atl. 9; Dail v. Taylor (1909) 151 N. C. 284, 66 S. E. 135.
23 Ragin v. Zimmermann (1929) 206 Cal. 723, 276 Pac. 107; Jones v. Tri-
State Tel. & Tel. Co. (1912) 118 Minn. 217, 136 N. W. 741.
24 Nixon v. Pfahler (1924) 279 Pa. St. 377, 124 AtI. 130.
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Presumably the foreign matter can only be present in the food
if some one has been negligent. If the article has been put up
in cans or other types of packages not designed to be opened until
the food reaches the ultimate consumer, the same principles ap-
ply with respect to control that have caused the dispute over the
liability of the bottler of soda water for injuries caused by ex-
plosion of the bottles.25 If the food has merely been prepared by
the assembly of the various ingredients, which were themselves
grown or partially prepared by another, it would seem that the
necessary element of control was not present unless the ingredi-
ents were of such a nature that the presence of the foreign mat-
ter must have been revealed in the subsequent preparation for
serving if due care had been exercised.2 6
It seems to be generally agreed that automobile accidents do
not normally occur unless some one has been negligent, except in
those cases in which the immediate cause of the accident was the
skidding of the car.2 7 A few courts seem to think that there is
an inference of negligence even when the evidence has not nega-
tived the possibility that the automobile skidded.28 However, it
would seem in the ordinary case that it would be very dubious
whether the driver had that complete control of the instrumen-
tality which is required by the classic statements of the rule.29
There is normally some traffic upon the streets. If the traffic is
at all heavy the conduct of the driver must be governed largely
by the conduct of a multitude of other drivers and pedestrians
over whom he has no control. It is true that the doctrine might
safely be applied in situations in which the traffic is slight, but it
would be a puzzling problem to say exactly at what point the
traffic becomes too heavy for its application. Also the plaintiff
was probably in motion, either on foot or in another car. In view
of these facts it would seem that the doctrine should not be ap-
plied in automobile accidents, except perhaps where the traffic
is light and the defendant has struck a stationary vehicle or
pedestrian. It would seem that the plaintiff is given ample pro-
26 Horn & Hardart Baking Co. v. Lieber (C. C. A. 3, 1928) 25 F. (2d)
449; Rost v. Kee & Chappell Dairy Co. (1920) 216 Ill. App. 497; Pillars v.
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1918) 117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365; Freeman v.
Schults Bread Co. (1916) 100 Misc. 528, 163 N. Y. S. 396.
O'Brein v. Liggett Co. (1926) 255 Mass. 553, 152 N. E. 57; Swenson v.
Purity Baking Co. (Minn. 1931) 236 N. W. 310; Jacobs v. Childs Co. (1916)
166 N. Y. S. 798; note (1927) 47 A. L. R. 148.
27 James v. Van Schuckman (Conn. 1932) 162 Atl. 3; Lambert v. Eastern
Massachusetts St. Ry. (1922) 240 Mass. 495, 134 N. E. 340; Linden v. Miller
(1920) 172 Wis. 20, 177 N. W. 909.
28 Linberg v. Stargo (Cal. 1931) 297 Pac. 9.
29 Wing v. London General Omnibus Co. (1909) 2 K. B. 652.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol18/iss1/5
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
tection by the humanitarian doctrine and the general partiality
of juries for plaintiffs under such circumstances.
In Seaman v. Curtis Flying ServiCe30 the Appellate Division
reversed the decision of the trial court which had been based on
the ground that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine should be applied in
a case where the plaintiff's intestate was killed when the plane
in which he was a passenger was wrecked in an attempted land-
ing. Certainly the doctrine should not be applied to airplane ac-
cidents. It is true that the plaintiff is probably ignorant of the
details of flying and hence would have difficulty in pointing out
specific negligence, but too little is yet known about flying for it
to be said that accidents are solely due to negligence. Instru-
ments and flying equipment have not yet been perfected to a suffi-
cient degree to give the pilot complete control over his plane re-
gardless of atmospheric conditions.
It would be a great aid to the development of a proper legal
system if the courts would undertake to decide each case as it
arose by reference to the fundamental principles which govern
the application of the rule. It may perhaps be desirable that
under certain circumstances liability regardless of negligence
should be imposed. If so, this should be done by the legislature
rather than by the judges' permitting the jury to infer negligence
under such circumstances.
NORMAN PARKER, '34.
UNSETTLED PROBLEMS IN STATE CONTROL OF CON-
TRACTS BETWEEN PUBLIC UTILITIES AND
AFFILIATED COMPANIES
The troubles which recently have beset the tangled mass of pub-
lic utility holding companies have thrown into sharp relief the
need for further regulation of these companies. The pyramiding
of financial structures and the excessive prices paid for con-
trolling stock interests in operating utilities and other holding
companies show that somewhere there must be possibilities of
great financial returns to the groups which control a far flung
organization of local operating companies. To many of the
state commissions charged with the regulation of public utilities
it has appeared that a rich source of such revenue is profits on
contracts made by local utilities with other companies controlled
by the same interests. These contracts may be for the supply of
80 (1930) 231 App. Div. 867, 247 N. Y. S. 251. See also Sollack v. State of
New York (N. Y. Ct. of Claims, 1927) 1929 U. S. Av. Rep. 42; Osterhoust,
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur as Applied to Aviation (1931) 2 Air L. Rev. 9.
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